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5.3 
The fundamental problem about blame and responsibility has, in my opinion, 
been solved by P.F. Strawson's paper 'Freedom and Resentment'.1 I have discussed 
this at length elsewhere,2 and shall here merely offer a quick sketch, before pro· 
ceeding to use this work of Strawson's to illuminate the concept of punishment. 
The basic problem about a�countability is to explain and justify our way of 
distinguishing actions for which the agent is accountable from those for which he 
isn't - e.g. between causes of an action which we do and those which we don't 
regard as 'compelling' the action to be performed or 'preventing' its non-perform­
ance. We can say where this line Is drawn, but the question is: why draw it just 
there? · 
I know of only three kinds of answer· to this question. 
· The radical libertarian answer rests on a tendentious view about where the 
line falls, namely that an agent is accountable, and is not compelled to act, only if 
his action was not fully caused by antecedent events. I shall dismiss this without 
argument; but only because I have not time for the argument which' it deserves. 
Secondly, there are theories like that of Schlick, which go as follows. When 
someone acts in a manner which we welcome (regret), we do or should be con· 
cerned to increase (decrease) the likelihood of his doing so again. One way of doing 
this is 'by moral pressures - equipping the agent with encouraging (deterring) be­
liefs of the form 'If I perform an A, the upshot will be ... ,' so as to motivate him to 
perform (not perform) A actions on future comparable occasions. Moral pressures 
range from raised eyebrows to dire punishments, and from encouraging smiles to 
lavish rewards. Within this context, Schlickian theories ofter their rationale for the 
line between accountable and non-accountable, by describing it as the line between 
cases where moral pressures, do and ones where they don't have some chance of 
being effective. 
The trouble with Schlickian theories is that in providing only for a teleologi­
cal, remedial, encouraging or deterrent approach to human conduct, they omit an 
important part of the story - the part involving genuine praise and genuine blame. 
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It is sometimes said that we ought to give up blame and everything which concept­
ually depends upon it (e.g. genuine punishment) in favour of the forward-looking 
technique of deterrence through �hreatening moral pressures. But nobody urges us 
to give up praise, gratitude, etc. in favour of the clean-cut forward·looking use of 
encouraging moral pressures! Anyway, I shall assume that we all want to improve 
on Schlickian theories if we can. 
2. Strawson's solution 
' . .  
Strawson distinguishes reactive attitudes from a kind of attitude which he 
calls objective and which could also be called· teleological: If you ·do 'something 
which ·1 regret, my attitude is objective and teleological in so far as I think about 
why you did it and how I can reduce the likelihood of your doing i� again: this kind 
of attitude could be adopted towards the catching of a cold, say, .or the leaking of a 
roof. But if I am indignant or resentful or angry, or if my feelings are, hurt, my 
attitude is reactive: it is a kind of attitude which an adult will have only towards a 
personal object - either an actual person or else something like theologized weather 
or an anthropomorphized dog. Similarly, if you do something which I welcome, I 
may· in an objective frame of mind bend my efforts to encouraging you to do it 
again, or I may respond reactively with sheer gratitude. 
Those remarks aim only at giving the general drift. They do not purport to 
define 'reactive', that being something I don't know how t'o do. 
Strawson presents moral praise and blame and their kin �s speCial kinds of 
reactive attitudes. In a nutshell: blame is to be understood as a development of the 
more primitive response of resentment, and praise as an outgrowth of gratitude. To 
get clear about praise and blame and their near relatives, �trawson says, we must 
get clear about reactive attitu<;les generally. For a start, we can now pinpoint the 
defect in Schlickian theories, which is that they provide only for objective-teleo­
logical responses to actions and not for reactive ones. 
Using the concept of a reactive attitude, Strawson offers a third rationale for 
the line between .accountable and non-accountable. Where the radical libertarian 
rationale rests on bad metaphysics, and the Schlickian one is shallow, Strawson's 
is at once coherent and adequate to the facts o,f the human condition. 
It has two premises. (1) Reactive attitudes are essentially responses to the 
attitudes of other people . . (2) Reactive attitudes properly belong to a context of 
involved, reciprocating, adult, interpersonal . relationships. Because of (1), it is in­
appropriate to respond reactively to ·a good action which. wasn't really well-meant, 
or to a bad one which wasn't really ill-meant - e.g. if the agent 'didn't realize ... ,' 
or· 'couldn't help ... ,' or was acting under duress, etc. And because' of (2), a reactive 
attitude is inappropriate if the agent is, �t. least temporarily', incapable of entering 
into fully adult interpersonal relationships, e.g. because he is one year old or hope­
lessly schizophrenic. These two lines of thought combine to generate a fresh account 
of the point and purpose of the accountable/non-accountable distinction: the realm 
of accountability is that in which reactive attitudes would not be downright In· 
appropriate for one or other of the two reasons .I have outli��d.This puts the dis· 
tinction just about where S�hlickian theories put it; but it explaiins better than they 
do why it is placed just there. · 
3� Justifying reactive attitudes . 
Strawsor.. says that reactive attitudes are so deep in our 11atures that there 
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couldn't be a serious question ·of giving them up. Still, if we could give them up, 
ought we to? Strawson says No: in so far as one can imagine a world where au our 
inter-personal responses were strictly objective and teleological, the prospect is 
horrifyingly unattractive. 
Notice that the question 'Ought we to give up reactive l\ttitudes?' is being 
treated as a practical one - more like 'Ought we to give up music?' than like 'Ought 
we to give- up quantum theory?' That is because reactive attitudes are matters of 
feeling rather than of judgment. If you do something which I regret, there is the 
factual question of whether a reactive attitude would be simply inappropriate, e.g. 
because you are· insane or because your hand slipped; but if I know that it would 
not be inappropriate, my actually being indignant, or instead my coolly viewing 
the matter in an objective and remedial frame of mind, depends upon personal 
choice, the mood of the moment, some aspect of my personal style. That is all it 
.£!!! depend .upon: it cannot arise f.rom some further perception of the objective 
indignation-worthiness of your action. 
So when we contemplate the picture offer-ed. us by Schlf ckian theories, and 
observe that there is a gap in them, what we are noticing is the absence of reactive 
attitudes. Do not think that the gap is to be filled by a further kind of fact about 
the moral quality of actions (their objective blameworthiness or praiseworthiness) 
and that reactive attitudes involve judgments about or perceptions of those facts. 
Rather, Strawson says, 'it is just these attitudes themselves which fill the gap.'J 
4. A problem about penal theory and practice 
Granted that we should not relinquish reactive attitudes altogether, there are 
contexts in wlhich they are so counter-productive that they ought to be excluded as 
a matter of policy: Strawson instances the attitudes of a psycho-analyst towards 
his patient. Perhaps another such context is the application of the penal system. 
Although it would be dreadful if all human inter-reactions were of the teleological 
sorts provided for by Schlickian theories, it might be a positively good thing if every 
question about the disposition of offenders against the law were settled by teleo­
logical considerations. I shall state that case for that view, as abstractly as possible. 
I shall say litUe about what the ends should be - whether they should include pre­
vention, deterrence, reform, the forestalling of private revenge. etc.; and shall say 
nothing about how the welfare of the offenders, victims, etc. should be balanced 
against that of society, or about what it is for an individual or a society to fare well. 
My concern is only with the highly abstract thesis that the treatment of offenders 
should be con�rolled purely by thoughts of the desirability of upshots. The rival 
thesis says that the handling of offenders should be coloured by reactive attitudes -
that it should involve not merely treatment/reform/deterrence/prevention and the 
like, but also genuine punis.hment, with this being thought of as connected with 
blame and indignation and reactive attitudes generally. 
Of course the traditional rival to an ends-and-means approach to punishment 
is the view that it is all right to punish offenders because they deserve it. I don't 
think that that is wrong: I offer Strawson's approach not as a replacement for the 
notion of desert, but rather as a way of deepening and strengthening it, though no 
doubt also changing it a bit in the process. I shall say a little more about this shortly. 
5. A case for a purely teleological penal system 
On any theory, a penal system is bound to involve unpleasantness for the 
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offender. Consider the effects of that upon his character. Even if we don't aim to 
reform him, presumably we don't contentedly .acquiesce in the destruction or ser­
ious damaging of his character, making him insecure, self-hating, bitter, alienat�d, 
aimless and despairing. But any penal system which makes offenders suffer runs a 
permanent risk of damaging them, because of that very basic fact of human nature 
which Auden used in his short explanation of Hitler: 
I and the public know 
What all schoolchildren learn, 
Those to whotn evil is done 
Do evil in return. 4 
This inescapable problem of minimizing damage to the offenders' characters, while 
not being self -defeatingly lenient, is too serious· to be ignored; and it is too difficult 
to be soluble without the help of the most informed, careful and intelligent atten­
tion to ends-and-means that we can possibly muster - in short, without an unre­
mittingly objective and teleological attitude. 
Other damage whiCh penal systems could do generates other arguments for 
objectivity and teleology in penal theory and practice. I offer that central one as a 
stand-in for the rest. 
It might be replied that although of course penal systems should involve care· 
ful attention to means and ends, they should also express reactive attitudes. But 
where in the system are such attitudes to find expression? In the penal code itself, 
or in its application? Each alternative involves grave difficulties. 
First, the penal code. General policies fixing penalties for kinds of offence 
might be shaped partly by our indignation over this or that sort of offence. But our 
indignations cannot make a difference unless they sometimes lead us to assign a 
more severe penalty than we would have assigned had we been guided purely by 
thoughts of ends and means: e.g. in fixing the penalty for armed robbery, we bal­
ance the need not to damage the offender's character against the needs of deterren­
ce and physical prevention and the forestalling of private vengeance, etc., and then 
we tilt the balance towards greater severity because armed robbery makes our blood 
boil. This seems clearly to be morally intolerable. It is one thing to accept a degree 
of imprudence m the price of spontaneity in our daily lives; it is quite another to 
depart carefully from the course of prudence, wisdom, humane and carefu� firm­
ness, etc. so that our cool policies may reflect the way we behave when we are 
neither cool nor politic. -
Secondly, the application of the penal code. Reactive attitudes might enter 
the system by our leaving certain decisions open, to be settled on the spur of the 
moment according to the feelings of the judge, the jury, the prosecutor, the victim 
or his relatives, and so on. That would be a stirring reminder of that warm, erratic 
spontaneity which is so valuable in our personal lives; but it would greatly increase 
the risk of the penal system's doing gross damage, and - wor:se - it would violate 
the essence of law, which must be expressible in general principles which can be 
objectively applied. The suggested use of reactive attitudes would expose the law 
to those influences of passion and of personal involvement which civilized legal 
systems rightly strive to keep out. 
6. Four counter-attacks met 
It is sometimes said that a purely teleological approach to penology involves 
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a demeaning or dehumanizing attitude towards offenders (the offender's alleged 
'right of punishment' comes in here). But nobody would think that a psycho-ana­
lyst must dehumanize his patient when he treats him, with clinical objectivity, as a 
'case', rather than responding to him in a fuHy personal and thus partly reactive 
manner. If indeed he subtracts from anyone's humanity, it is from his own. Nor 
does he imply that his patient is not a fit partner for a fully interacting relation­
ship: it is just that there is a time and a place for everything, and psycho-analysis 
goes better - to put it mildly - if the analyst's disgusts and indignations are kept 
out of it. All this· might apply equally to the sentencing judge's attitude to the con­
vict. An opponent mil!ht say, threateningly, 'If to all offenders, then why not fo all 
mankind?' - that threat is mentioned by Strawson,5 and though he doesn't 
endorse it he doesn't say either, as I now do, that there are powerful reasons for 
restrictions of attitude towards 'all offenders' which do not imply similar restric­
tions of attitude towards 'all mankind'. 
· It has been said that in treating offenders teleologically one exhibits a mean, 
impoverished, lowering view of what matters most - e.g. in putting 'law and order,' 
naively construed, before individual welfare. But one can pursue ends without pur­
suing those ends! A strictly teleological penal system could reflect a really generous 
view of human values and rights and potentialities. 
My third point, which probably doesn't need to be made, is that in keeping 
reactive attitudes entirely ·out of the penal system, we need not ignore any relevant 
facts about reactive attitudes. If people feel so indignant about burglary, say, that 
if burglars are not punished severely there is a risk of vigilante action, that may be 
a reason to step up the penalties for burglary. If rape-victims have feelings of shame 
or guilt which constitute part of the harm they have suffered, that adds to the 
gravity of the offence of rape, which may have implications about how rapists 
should be dealt with. But thought ctbout these matters may belong entirely to the 
realm of means and ends, the realm of the objective teleological attitude. 
Fourthly : it may be said that a purely teleological system would not really 
be penal, would not involve punishment properly so-called. That may well be right, 
for punishment seems essentially to look back to the deed rather than forward to 
the future. But what's in a name? The defender of a purely teleological disposition 
of offenders can agree that what he is recommending is indeed a 'remedial' rather 
than a 'penal' system. 
7 .  Reactive attitudes and justice 
So much for difficulties which can be met; now for one which cannot. It is 
the famous old difficulty about fairness or justice, which is something we think 
penal systems should aim at, and which cannot be fully captured by a strictly 
teleo1ogical ( consequentialist, utilitarian) approach. Even if in very extraordinary 
circumstances it could be right to 'punish' someone who was known to be innocent, 
that is still prima facie a dreadful thing to do - something which couldn't be justi­
fied merely because it led to a somewhat better state of affairs than could otherwise 
have been obtained. Our thinking about penal systems, then, retains a non-teleo­
logical element, even if we do everything we decently can to eliminate the idea of 
I?U_!?-ishment as retribution: it. is the element which says that the_ permissibility of 
making someone suffer depends partly upon whether he has done wrong. 
A determined utilitarian might say that this element should be weeded out 
also. 'It would in fact seldom be expedient to "punish" an innocent person,' he 
might say, 'and it is our muddled apprehension of this fact which leads us to think 
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that it would be wrong to "punish" such a person even if it were expedient to do 
so.' This position, properly understood, is less disgraceful than it seems on the sur­
face; but no one would accept it if they could see a valid alternative. 
The alternative, of course, is the non-teleological thesis that it is prima facie 
wrong to inflict suffering on the innocent, even when it is expedient to do so. The 
problem is to give a clear, deep reason for this without committing oneself to some 
unacceptable theory. Traditional theories about how offenders deserve punishment 
have characteristically rud two bad features. One is that they don't just permit us to 
punish offenders but require us to do so. A 'desert' theorist may assert that the 
punishiMnt of the guilty is permissible but not mandatory; but I have never seen a 
principled basis for this position, as distinct from its being offered ad hoc as a pair 
of doctrines which are tailored to fit our moral intuitions without being made to 
fit into any underlying theory. When the notion of desert is rooted in Strawson's 
doctrine about reactive attitudes, however, we get as a deeply grounded theorem 
the result that punishment of the guilty is permissible but not mandatory; which is 
just what most of us ·want. . 
The second bOO feature of traditional theories about desert is that they '<:an't help 
stumbling over the notion of an offender who doesn't deserve punishment because 
·in offending be was not free or responsible or accountable; and it is a symptom of 
this difficulty that such theories tend to be associated with that radical libertarian­
ism which I mentioned earlier, saying that an offender is not accountable or de· 
serving of punishment unless his offence was not fully caused by prior states of 
affairs. This is a muddle, I believe, but not an easy one to escape from. One of the 
great virtues of Strawson's doctrine of reactive attitudes is that it shows us how to 
get out of this tangled trouble about determinism and accountability. 
Those are my two main reasons for thinking that the notion of deservingness 
stands in need of help which is lavishly provided by Strawson. I haven't shown that 
I am right on either count: I have merely indicated what my conclusion is on this 
matter, and hinted at how I would argue for it if there were time to do so. Since 
there isn't time, I now tum my back on the concept of desert, and proceed purely 
in terms of Strawson's concept of reactive attitudes. 
The most basic way in which' our willingness that a man should suffer is con· 
nected with our belief that he has offended is through their roles in adverse reactive 
attitudes. If I resent some attitude of yours towards me, my resentment must in­
volve some measure of willingness that some unpleasantness should befall you. An 
adverse reacti�e attitude essentially involves some disposition to hit back or to be 
pleased if God or Nature does it for one. To divorce judging som�one to be an offen­
der from willingness that he should suffer, therefore, we should have to strip our­
selves of all adverse reactive attitudes; and that is unthinkable or unacceptable. So 
the connection between 'He offended' and 'It is all right to make him suffer' is 
forged by an aspect of human nature which is ineliminable and undisgraceful; and 
that aspect of our natures is what is expressed in our judgment that guilt but not 
innocence justifies the infliction of suffering. 
That is a rather peculiar justification of the judgment in question: it doesn't 
derive it from accepted moral principles, but rather shows it to be an upshot - not 
through muddle or error - of a valuable aspect of human nature. Without proving 
any theorem about guilt and suffering, it provides evidence that something would 
have gone wrong if we rejected, on principle, policies which connect guilt with 
suffering; and that does, after a fashion, justify such policies. 
The foregoing attempt to base the concept of penal justice on reactive atti· 
tudes is Strawson's, I believe. He says that 'to speak in terms of social utility alone 
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is 'to leave out something· vital in our conception of [penal] practices, '6 . and 
he indicates that this 'something' is justice. He does not explain in detail how reac­
tive attitudes can make good this lacuna, and merely implies that the gap won't be 
filled unless our 'preparedness to acquiesce in [the] infliction of suffering on the 
offender .. .is all of a piece with' - or is on a 'continuum' with - reactive attitudes 
generally . 7
. 
Those phrases, 'all of a piece with' and 'on a continuum,' . vague 
as t�ey a�e, are exactly right if the line of thought is the one l have been presenting. 
8. Severity of penalties 
Even ir 'reactive attitudes underlie the 'view that someone's being an offender 
is relevant to the permissibility of making him suffer, it inight still ·be that every 
de(aile0d quest_ion about the penalizing of offenders should be rigorously governed 
by teleologiccil considerations. Reacti.ve attitudes could underlie our willingness to 
have a penal code of an·y kind, without affecting what specific code we adopt. So 
the case I presented in § 5 has not yet been seriously harmed. 
But there is a further problem to be faced. The thought that the innocent 
ought not to be made to suffer is linked with the thought that how much an offend· 
er should be made to suffer is limited by the mildness of his offence. It might be 
expedient to hang speeding drivers,8 for example, but we all find' such a penalty 
morally excessive for such an offence. This is a further non-teleological element .in 
our thin�ing which needs to be justified; explained, put in its place. . 
My coricem is only with judgments of the form 'P is too sever� a penalty for 
offence O.' Af:. for 'P is too lenient,' I believe that the lower limits on penalties for 
kinds of offence should be· �et by considerations of utility alone. This' is a common 
er.ough moral position, which is he1d for example bY, those who cannot swanow 
the · orthodox Chri�tian thesis that Man's sin required the paying of a price. It is, 
furth�rmore, a view· which is considerably reinforced by .the Strawsonian position I 
have been· developing: for that position bases .the notion of 'all right .to punish ' on 
that ·of 'adverse reactive attitudes appropriate' or ' ... not inappropriate.' To pro�d,e 
a basis for 'not all right not to punish' it would have to m�ke ropm for 'a�ve� 
reactive attitude mandatory;' hut I suhtl1it that reactive attitudes are never manqa­
tory, because ·�n !!!Y individu� case there is the legitimate option or' retreatin� from 
reactive attitudes into a more detached objectivity. 
· 
._, 
Let us now consider judgments abou't undue severity of .penalties .. These are 
not mentioned in 'Freedom and Resentment,,'. �nd seem to be ignored .throughout 
most of the phil.osophicaf literature on punishment. But they are worth investiga­
tion; and it wm turn out that reactive attitudes are again involved, though this time 
they-are not the whole story. . 
· There ·is .rio special problem about our iu.dgments that one offence is graver 
th�n another, or .one penalty more severe thl;ln another. These rest on judgments 
about which situations are worse for their inhabitants than which c;>thers, and these 
lie ne.ar the heart o( ai:iyone's valu,e-system. So we have a -f�rly unproblem1;tt�c 
notion of a more or less .grave offence,. and a more or less severe penalty. 
. .What about.the view that the leS;S grav,e an offen.ce is, the less severe should 
�e the maximum penalty.,for it? That, I suggest, is ,underpinned by a fact .about our 
everyday reactive attitudes. Even where .r�s�ntment is not inappropriate, its jnten­
si�y �ay .be judge.d to be excessive_: not n�cessarily �armful or inexpecUent, but 
sfmply dispr9porti0Qate �o its object. And similarly with gratitude and t�� �st. 
If our penal thinking generally is 'all of a piece with' or on a continuum with our 
everyday reactive attitudes, our judgment t�at severity of penalty should be_ con· 
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strained by gravity of offence could be on a continuum with our everyday sense 
that a given reactive attitude may be too intense for the instance of malignity. in· 
differenee, goodwill a whatever which arcxged it. And to the extent that this aspect of 
our ordinary reactive attitudes is a necessary and undisgraceful one, this is again a 
justification - of a slightly peculiar sort - for the judgment that a penalty may be 
unduly severe for a given offence. 
But that implies nothing abput what penalties a.re excessive for what offences. 
And we shan't get judgments about that from our ordinary reactive attitudes: they 
normally carry the thought 9f 'unpleasantness for the offender• !n far too thin and 
abstract a manner to put content into a penal code. It seems, then, that our specific 
judgments about undue severity - e.g. that hanging is a morally excessive penalty 
for speeding on the road - must have more than just our propensity for reactive 
attitudes to support them. 
Before saying in §10 what else I think is involved, I note three conditions 
which apparently must be satisfied by any acceptable theory about what underlies 
our specific judgments about the undue severity of sentences. 
9. Three constraints 
There is no non-moral relationship R such that our judgments about undue 
severity of penalties derive from a single principle of the form 'Every penalty should 
ha-ve relation R to the corresponding_ offence.'  I thus reject the attempt to use any­
thing like 'The punishment should fi-t the crime' as a basis for our undue-severity 
judgments, though it may be all right as a casual summing up of tMm. The most 
promising such · attempt is the one which, assuming that there are no victimless 
offences, talo:!s it that gravity of offence and severity of penalty both involve· amount 
of harm or suffering or disutility - in one case to victims and in the other to the 
offender. The idea is that that common elen:ient might generate a co-ordinating 
relation R between gravilty and seventy. But what, specifically, could R be? It 
would have to be something like 'not hurting the offender more than his offence 
risked hurting its victims,' so that the governing principle of our undue-severity 
judgments would be that no penalty should in that way outrun the offeru:e tor 
which it is being inflicted. But it is not hard to see that in countless cases this prin· 
ciple would yield no answer (e.g. someone who burns down a National Forest), in 
otheIS it would set the ceiling much too low (e.g. someone who steals a million 
dollars from a wealthy bank}, and in yet others it would set it far too high (e.g. 
someone who tortures a child to death). 
So (a) an acceptable theory about our undue-severity judgments. will no.t de­
rive them from any single principle of that form; it will represent the moral situa-
tion as more complex than that. . 
Our undue-severity judgments apparently do not derive from any underlying 
rooml principle_s: for we apparently' cannot argue much about them, as we can about 
moral judgments which have more general ones behind them. I may try to convince 
you ·tha.t penalty P is excessive for offence 0 b.y arguing that· it is not after all ex­
pedient, a by making you more aware of what P is actually like for someone under­
(oing it; but those moves bring m� to the end of my resources, which is not the 
case in a moral disagreement which has more moral theory underlying it. 
SO- (b) an acceptable theory will not trace our undue-severity judgments back 
to any substantial body of moral principles. 
But I do not infer that they are a mere jumble, resting on nothing of a. princi· 
pled or systematic kind. EVidence that they are not is provided by something which 
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has been happening throughout the western world over the past four centuries. The­
maximum penalties for various kinds of offence have been fairly steadily· decreasing 
in severity; and while that may reflect changing opinions about what is expedient 
(connected, for instance, with discoveries about how environment can harm char­
act�r), it also reflects changes in what is found to be morally permissible. The rela­
tive steadiness of this change suggests that such judgments have a basis which saves 
them from being a mere jumble. 
And (c) any acceptable theory about that basis must respect, and if possibfo 
explain, the historical change to whi�h I have referred. 
The above three constraints are all satisfied by the hypothesis I shall offer 
regarding the source of our undue-severity judgments. 
10. Sympathy 
Let us start with one aspect of the historical change which I have mentioned. 
Although we contemporaries sometimes disagree about the severity af penalties, 
none of us thinks that any conceivable offence could' make it permissible for the 
offender to be hung, drawn and quartered, or to be burned at the stake. What pr&· 
duces this difference between ourselves and the people af the England o.f Eiizaheth 
I'? 
Well, we in a sense cannot bear the thought that someone is at this moment 
being deliberately burned to death, whereas an Elizabethan could with equanimity 
bear the thoU1ght, and even the sight and sound and smell, of the burning. That is 
because we are less callous than the Elizabethans were: more prone than them to 
sympathy, fellow-feeling, pity, etc., when consciously aware of the suffering of 
others. There are reasons for that in turn, but I shall not pursue them. 
So much for the judgment that P could never be justified by the magnitude 
of any offence. As for the judgment that P is morally excessive for offence 0 in 
particular: I suggest that all sttch judgments arise from the inter-action of (1) our 
disposition towards sympathy, pity and the like, and (2) our propensity for reactive 
attitudes. My sympathy makes me prima facie unwilling that someone should suffer 
P; but my belief that he has committed 0 generates in me a level of resentment, 
indignation, etc. which dampens dowR my sympathy to a point where I am willing 
after all that P should be inflicted. The worse the offence, the greater the indigna: 
tion, and· so the greater the amount of sympathy that can be damped down by it; 
but only within certain limits, for there are sympathy-levels which cannot be over­
come by any reactive feelings, such as the pity I feel towards any actuaJ or imagined 
sufferer of death at the stake. (That is not to deny that it might be overcome by 
something else, e.g. if the alternative to burning one person to death were, certainly, 
• 
ten peqple's being burned to death.) 
·The gradual lowering of the penalty-ceilings over- the past four centuries, on 
this account, could be due to a gradual increase· in sympathy, the lessening of 
callousness; and the latter change has indeed occurred anti been manifested i� other 
areas as well as penology - e.g. in views about slavery, about indigence; about 
school discipline, and so on. There may also have been a change in the.propensity 
for adverse reactive attitudes, but we don't have to postulate one: the change in 
moral judgments. could be due to a change in one of the two ink!ractiag elements 
while the other lield steady. 
· (In all- of this l am agreeing with Strawson that sympathy, pity, etc. are rrot 
themselv,es reac'tive attitudes. ·One can· pity a babY: • horse, a- mentally m person,. 
perhal>$' a sparrow, in respect of which resentmmt;. gratitude, anger, jealousy , etc. 
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would be glaringly inappropriate.) 
I do not contend that those who devise a penal code set penalty-limits on the 
basis of the outcome of a struggle within them between spurts of indignation on 
the one hand and wellings of sympathy. on the other. On the contrary, they may 
dispassionately judge that 0 is a very grave offence, and ·dispassionately conclude 
from that that P is the appropriate maximum penalty for ·it. But I contend that 
when they make these judgments what they are doing is 'all of a piece with' (on a 
continuum with), and best understood in tetms of, what happens when sympathy 
is tempered by indignation. 
· On this account, our undue-severity judgments express a kind of limit on 
what we will tolerate in the way of suffering for an offender, these limits being 
direct upshot.5 of natural human sympathies rather than theorems derived from 
broader moral principles. The absence of. backing in moral theory explai�s why we 
can do so little to defend or argue about specific undue-severity judgments; while 
their rooting in fairly steady aspects of human natµre saves them from being a mere 
chaos, and helps to explain how they can have undergone change over the centuries. 
That satisfies two of my constraints, and the other is also clearly satisfied - my 
acc:ount does not invoke any super-principle saying that th� ,,punishment should 
'fit' the· crime. 
11. Rights 
A certain rival theory about undue-severity judgments -should be presented 
and refuted. · It says that our undue-severity judgments are based upon judgments 
about rights. 'Everyone has certain rights, some of whicb are lost when one offends 
against the law, the amount of loss being proportional to the gravity of the offence. 
So someone who has committed offence 0 may be subjected to penalty P only if 0 
is grave enough to have deprived -the offender .of his right n.ot to undergo P.' 
This fit.5 the historical fact I have mentioned, for the western world has taken 
a steadily more generous view of human rights. Whether the 'rights' approach also 
satisfies the other two constraints·is not worth discussing, however, for the approach 
fails anyway. · 
· Some questions about the handling of offenders a.re discussable in the lang­
uage of 'rights': does his crime ·deprive him of his right to physical freedom? his 
right to sexual. companionshit>? hls right to vote? his right' to complain? But if 
'rights' underlie all our judgments about undue severity of penalties, then innocent 
people must have, for instance, a right not to be gaoled for a month and a right not 
to be ,gaoled for a year, so tbat in a particular case an offender may be judged·,to 
have forfeited the former right but not the latter. And there are countless <>ther 
examples: the suggested aJ>proach would require .an enqlessly complex and elabor­
ate set of beliefs about negative rights - the right not to be treated thus-and-so -
which everyone hllS until they start being peeled off h.im by his offences against 
the law. Our apparatus of ,moral thinking .and reasoning does not include,. even 
unconsciously or dispositionally, any such structure as that� 1 
It might be objected that we. ne�d only to attribute to .innocent people a 
��ngle right, namely th� righ_t not to � �ade to suffer by .the law; and then further 
judgments will .-be made about how much of that ,right is lost when one cQm:mits a 
certain offence. But then the alleged basis for our judgments about undue sev�rity 
of penalties turns out to be a m�re rewording of them . . we.are to.base judgments of 
the form. 'Penalty P is .unduly severe for offence O' on ones of th� form 'Someone 
who commi� offence · 0 does not.lose enougti .of his. right not to be . . punishe.d t9 
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make it legitimate to inflict P upon· him:' Things have become more proliK, to be 
sure, but nothing has been done to exhibit system or structure in this. part of·our 
moral thinking: it could be that the putative judgments about 'how much of· his 
right hot to be punished he ihas lost because of his offence' are themselves a perfect 
jumble.· 
12. Coda 
How far has the purely teleological picture presented in § 5 suffen:d from the 
incursions of the demands of justice? Those demands involve (a) reactive attitudes, 
or something on a continuum with them, to justify having a penal system at all, 
and (b) human sympathies, or something on a continuum with them, to set upper 
limits to the severity of penalties. Of these two elements, (a) merely restricts the 
penal code to actual offenders. It is (b) which could affect the content of the penal 
code, by keeping specific penalty-limits lower than they might have been set if 
utility were the only guide. 
I contend that those are the o"'Y incursions of non-utilitarian elements which 
we should allow. So I am maintaining that in penal theory and practice considera­
tions of utility should hold sway within limits set by the requirement that the upper 
(not the lower) limits on penalties should :,e just . . Tb�t is a familiar enough doctrine, 
but I have tried to defend and deppen it. through. a general, Strawsonian theory of 
punishment. 
Some people think that more hann than good is dooe by overtly emphasizing deter­
rence, re:orm, etc. in implementing a· penal system, and that it wou\d be better if ends 
were never mentioned, and offence 0 were routinely penalized by i>enalty P to the 
accompaniment of judicial rhetoric about 'paying your debt to society.' If they are 
right, that is a reason for keeping- quiet about utility in the courtroom and the pri­
son; but so far from being a reason not to handle penological problems teleological­
ly, it is itself a utilitarian reason. 
One large problem-area remains untouched. Although I introduced Strawson's 
line of thought as a theory of the accountable/non-accountable tine, 1 have not 
brought lt to bear on the vexed question of criminal accountability or responsibil­
ity. 
A · purely remedial-teleological system needs only a Schllckian notion of re­
sponsibility, deeming offenders to be responsible in proportion as they are suscept­
ible to deterrence by moral pressures. But a genuinely penal system, if this is under­
stood in Strawson's way ( and what other way is there?), needs the concept of re­
sponsibility sketched at the end of §2 above. That is, it will want to know whether 
the act really did manifest the unacceptable attitude or intention which it seemed 
to, and wheth�r the agent is capable of entering into fully-fledged adult interper­
sonal relationships. 
The choice betweer. Schlick's account of the line and Strawson's might affec't 
what happens in courts of law. For although over a large extent of everyday life we 
draw a single accountable/non-accountable line which is accurately located· both by 
Schlick·'s and by Strawson's descriptions, the descriptions may sometimes part com· 
pany, so that for a given action the agent is accountable according to Schlick but 
not to Strawson or vice versa. 
The explicit adop.tion o.f .either acc9unt would surely pro�uce. cha!lges in the 
present indeterminate and muddled handling of the concept of responsibility in the 
courts. And although in public affairs clarity is not always desirable, I suspect that 
at least some uses of the concept of criminal responsibility would be improved if 
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we - our courts, our civilization - became clearer about it. For example, many 
people tend to think that if a crime is utterly vile, cruel, depraved, the criminal 
must be insane and thus not a fit subject for punishment at all; yet none of us has a 
sufficiently clear, determinate, and valid concept of insanity to entitle us to such an 
inference. Perhaps we don't need one: perhaps we are right to think that punishment 
is inappropriate for the worst criminals, but not because they are insane. Strawson· 
ian reasons might be given for that. But a full discus.sion of how reactive attitudes 
relate to crimin�l responsibility must be reserved for another paper. 
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